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Abstract 
In a time of rising Euroscepticism across Europe, diffuse support for the European Union (EU) 
is an especially important concept as it provides a source of stability for the EU. How important 
is childhood political socialization for the development of diffuse support? The extant literature 
emphasizes the role of childhood socialization. However, these studies are based on analyses 
that cannot fully distinguish between the cohort effect and the life-cycle effect. This study 
overcomes this limitation by looking at a more suitable case (the European Union) and by using 
a novel technique that effectively distinguishes the cohort effect from the life-cycle effect. The 
findings show that individuals who experienced early life political socialization in the EU have 
equal levels of diffuse support as individuals who grew up outside the EU. I thus argue that 
diffuse support develops through experience in adult life, and childhood political socialization 
is not essential for its development. 
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Euroscepticism among European citizens is one of the most serious challenges facing 
the European Union (EU). The Brexit referendum, as well as a strong showing of populist 
Eurosceptic candidates in Dutch, French and Austrian elections, are just a few examples of this 
Eurosceptic wave. These developments suggest that large numbers of citizens in EU member 
states feel dissatisfied with the EU. This lack of support has potentially serious consequences 
for the stability of the EU as a political system. If a political system experiences an economic 
or other crisis, citizens’ support is an important resource the system can draw upon in order to 
weather the crisis. Given the current wave of rising Euroscepticism, understanding why 
individuals support the political system of the EU becomes especially important.  
In assessing the stability of political systems, one type of mass public political support 
- diffuse support - is particularly important. Diffuse support is an affective attachment to 
the political system. Thanks to this quality, diffuse support provides the political system with 
a source of resilience in times of crisis (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). Although 
there is a fairly good accumulation of knowledge about the existence of diffuse support for 
political systems (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014; Dalton, 2004; Down and Wilson, 2017; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Norris, 1999; Serricchio et al., 2013), it is not very clear how this 
source of political systems’ stability comes about. The dominant line of the existing research 
emphasizes early life political socialization as the key factor in the development of diffuse 
support (Down and Wilson, 2013; Lutz et al., 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2007; Sapiro, 2004). 
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Other works, however, suggest that later life experience is the key determinant of diffuse 
support in adulthood (Bruter, 2009; Mishler and Rose, 2007). How important, then, is early 
life political socialization for the development of diffuse support? The goal of this article is to 
answer this question and improve our understanding of the sources of diffuse support for the 
EU as well as our understanding of diffuse support as a general concept. 
I examine the relationship between early life political socialization and diffuse support 
by using a novel technique that allows me to overcome a problem that is endemic to all studies 
of early life socialization’s effects on later life attitudes. Studies of childhood socialization’s 
effects struggle to identify whether the observed differences between generations are a result 
of experience during one’s childhood or whether these differences are a result of attitude 
changes as individuals go through the life cycle. The specificities of the historical development 
of the EU allow me to overcome this problem and employ an innovative methodology that 
effectively distinguishes the cohort effect from the life-cycle effect (Dinas and Stoker, 2014). 
By exploiting the fact that different countries joined European integration at different points in 
time, this methodology is able to focus directly on the impact of early life political socialization 
while controlling for the effect of age. Using data from the Eurobarometer studies, I find that 
early life political socialization into the European supranational political system does not 
influence the level of diffuse support for the EU in adulthood. In contrast to the prevailing view 
in the existing literature, I argue that early life political socialization into the political system 
of the EU does not determine diffuse support in later life and that diffuse support for the EU 
develops as a result of later life experience.  
These findings have several practical implications for the EU. First, the findings imply 
that relying on early life political socialization as a generator of citizens' lasting affective 
support for the EU is not enough. The EU needs to provide positive experiences for adult 
citizens in order to maintain and reinforce citizens' diffuse support. Second, the results of this 
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study imply that gaining a new population either through immigration or through the accession 
of new EU member states does not necessarily constitute a weak spot in terms of public support 
for the political system of the EU. Given that early life political socialization is not essential 
for the development of an affective attachment to the EU, the new members of the population 
can learn to support their new political system as effectively as if they had grown up in it. 
 
Literature review and hypothesis 
Diffuse political support is a category within a broader concept of mass public political 
support. There are two types of political support: specific and diffuse. Specific support is a 
‘running-tally’ type of attitude that fluctuates according to the current performance of the 
political system. If citizens are satisfied with the political system’s performance, specific 
support is high. If they are not satisfied, specific support decreases. In contrast, diffuse support 
is an affective attitude. It is independent of the current performance of the political system. 
Diffuse support persists even in times when citizens become dissatisfied with the regime’s 
policies (Easton, 1965; Harteveld et al., 2013; Norris, 1999). Although diffuse support is 
resistant to momentary changes in performance, from a long-term perspective, regime 
performance may affect diffuse support as well. Similarly, a long period of good regime 
performance helps generate diffuse support (Mishler and Rose, 2007).  
Together, specific and diffuse support make up the overall political support that 
an individual has for a given political object. In other words, overall political support is a mix 
of these two types of support. In the case of some political objects (such as incumbent 
politicians), the specific type of support prevails in the mix. In cases of other political objects 
(such as the political nation), diffuse support is the prevailing type of support (Norris, 2011). 
Given these empirical findings, it may be tempting to equate diffuse support to support for the 
political system. This would be misleading, however. The quality of support (diffuse or specific) 
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is conceptually different from the object towards which support is directed. Keeping this 
theoretical distinction allows us to study whether a political system enjoys an affective (diffuse) 
or performance-based (specific) political support. Each of these types of political support 
provides the system with a different level of stability in times of crisis. Since people tend to 
view the performance of a political system more negatively during a crisis, a political system 
enjoying diffuse support has more resilience in times of crisis than a political system that draws 
its political support on a good performance.  
Empirical studies of attitudes towards the EU show that there is both diffuse and 
specific support for the EU (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; 
Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998; Down and Wilson, 2017; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Ringlerova, 2015b; Serricchio et al., 2013; Torcal et al., 2012a; 
Torcal et al., 2012b). Since specific support and diffuse support are two distinct attitudes, they 
develop in different types of processes. Specific support is an up-to-date barometer reflecting 
the individual’s current satisfaction with how well the political system works. Diffuse support, 
on the other hand, is not easily swayed by momentary changes in individuals’ assessment of 
the political system’s performance. How, then, does affective support for the political system 
develop?  
The existing literature on the origins of diffuse support distinguishes between two 
views. According to one view, early life political socialization is the critical period for the 
development of affective support for the political system (Mishler and Rose, 2007). During 
childhood individuals first encounter the political system and form uncritically positive 
opinions of the political system and its representatives (Carter and Teten, 2002). Through 
formal education, children are taught to respect the political system, to be proud of their 
political community, and to respect the symbols of the political system, such as the flag or the 
anthem. All these experiences instil in young individuals an affective attachment to the political 
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system that persists into adulthood (Down and Wilson, 2013; Mishler and Rose, 2007; Sapiro, 
2004).  Support for this line of argument has been found not only in comparative research but 
also in research focusing on the EU. Studies on generational differences in public support for 
the EU show that younger generations of Europeans have higher overall support for the EU as 
well as higher diffuse support for the EU than older generations (Down and Wilson, 2013; 
Down and Wilson, 2017). Early life socialization is emphasized as the key factor explaining 
these between-generational differences (Down and Wilson, 2013; Lutz et al., 2006). 
How does early life socialization influence diffuse support in later life? Thanks to the 
specific character of the European political system, one can expect that differences in early life 
political socialization among European citizens will lead to observable differences in the level 
of diffuse support for the EU in adulthood. European citizens vary greatly in the level of early 
life socialization into the political system of the EU. Over time, European integration has been 
progressing. More power has been moved to the supranational level at the expense of the power 
of the individual member states. As a result, younger generations of European citizens have 
grown up in a more closely integrated Europe than older generations. Furthermore, European 
integration has been expanding geographically as well. Therefore, some EU citizens joined the 
EU as adults, without experiencing the European political system as children. All this variation 
in the level of early life political socialization into the political system of the EU provides 
leverage in the study of the effects of early life political socialization on diffuse support for the 
EU in adulthood. 
There are powerful reasons why early life socialization into the political system of the 
EU may matter for diffuse support in later life. As Down and Wilson (2013) argue, the type of 
political system that an individual experiences in early life sets the ‘normal’ for what a political 
system is supposed to look like. Therefore, if an individual experiences childhood in a political 
system with strong national power, such a political system constitutes her baseline experience.  
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For such an individual, moving to a political system that puts more power at the supranational 
level means entering unfamiliar territory. Such an individual may be more hesitant to express 
support for the supranational political system since putting more power at the supranational 
level differs greatly from the familiar picture learned in childhood. In contrast, an individual 
who grew up in a strongly integrated EU is socialized in a political system where substantial 
power at the supranational level is the status quo. For such an individual, political power at the 
supranational level is something familiar rather than something that challenges her ingrained 
view about what a political system looks like. As a result, it is expected that individuals who 
grew up in a more integrated Europe will have more diffuse support for the EU than individuals 
who experienced their childhood in a political system with little or no European integration. 
In addition, in contrast to growing up in a political system without much European 
integration, growing up in a strongly integrated Europe is more likely to lead to lasting diffuse 
support for the EU. Unlike a weakly integrated Europe, a strongly integrated Europe is more 
noticeable to its citizens. Symbols of the EU, such as the flag, license plates, ID cards, and 
passports, are clearly visible and are an integral part of daily life. This more noticeable presence 
of European integration in daily life allows young individuals to accept the EU as something 
familiar and normal. Taking the EU as the status quo political system then allows young 
individuals to develop diffuse support for the political system that persists into adulthood. In 
contrast, individuals who were raised amidst weaker European integration did not have the 
same opportunity to develop lasting diffuse support in early life. Therefore, according to this 
theoretical view, the level of early life socialization into the political system of the EU will 
influence the level of diffuse support for the EU in adulthood. 
The other view of the origins of diffuse support emphasizes later life experience as the 
most important source of diffuse support. This latter view does not completely deny the 
importance of early life political socialization but argues that later life political experience 
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outweighs the influence of early life political socialization (Mishler and Rose, 2007). 
Individuals learn about the political system throughout their adult life from the media and from 
their personal experiences. The accumulation of positive experience with the political system, 
as well as exposure to the symbols of the system, create an affective attachment to the political 
system (Easton, 1965; Mishler and Rose, 2007). In the case of the EU, cross-sectional public 
opinion studies show that the level of diffuse support is related to benefits flowing from 
EU membership, to the effects of economic globalization (Isernia et al., 2012), and to trust in 
national political institutions (Harteveld et al., 2013). Although this suggests that long-term 
exposure to these influences builds diffuse support over time, the cross-sectional research 
design is not well equipped for detecting the sources of diffuse support. The results of the cross-
sectional studies are, therefore, only suggestive. Nevertheless, there is experimental evidence 
complementing the cross-sectional studies. An experimental study on European identity, which 
is one of the forms of diffuse support for the EU, shows that European identity tends to grow 
after long-term exposure to the symbols of the EU and positive news about the Union (Bruter, 
2009). 
Although existing studies present valuable insights into the origins of diffuse support 
for the EU, the question of the extent to which early life political socialization determines 
diffuse support in later life is not clearly answered. General comparative literature, as well as 
EU-specific literature, finds that early life political experience is one of the key determinants 
of diffuse support in later life (Down and Wilson, 2013; Easton, 1965; Lutz et al., 2006; Mishler 
and Rose, 2007). More recent research on diffuse support for the EU, however, suggests that 
early life political socialization has very little effect on diffuse support for the EU in later life 
(Ringlerova, 2015a). In addition, research focusing on the effects of later life socialization 
suggests that later life socialization has substantial influence, as well (Bruter, 2009; Mishler 
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and Rose, 2007). As highlighted by Down and Wilson (2017), the extent to which early life 
political socialization influences diffuse support in later life, therefore, remains a puzzle. 
In this article, I resolve this puzzle by employing a novel approach to analyzing the 
relationship between early life political socialization and diffuse support for the EU. In contrast 
to the existing studies, my analysis allows for a much clearer examination of the effect of early 
life socialization. In studies of the effects of childhood socialization, it is generally very 
difficult to determine whether the observed effect results from early life socializing experience 
or from changing attitudes as individuals become older. By employing a design-based 
approach to Age-Period-Cohort (APC) analysis (Dinas and Stoker, 2014), the present study 
distinguishes the effect of childhood socializing experience from the effect of age much more 
effectively than prior studies. 
In sum, the goal of this study is to determine whether early life political socialization 
matters for diffuse support in later life. Following the prevailing theoretical view in the 
literature (Down and Wilson, 2013; Lutz et al., 2006), I hypothesize that more childhood 
socialization into the European political system will lead to more diffuse support for the EU in 
adulthood: The more socialization influence an individual experiences of the European 
supranational political system in early life, the more diffuse support for the EU she will have 
in adulthood. 
The next section presents the analysis testing this hypothesis. The analysis has two parts. 
First, I take a broad cross-sectional view and examine Eurobarometer data from 25 EU member 
states. Second, I narrow the analysis down to two countries: Denmark and Sweden. Although 
narrowing the analysis down to just two countries weakens the generalizability of the results 
in comparison to the broad cross-sectional analysis, it allows for stronger causal leverage in 




Method, data, and variables 
Studies that aim at identifying the effect of early life political socialization on later life 
attitudes face a methodological problem. The problem stems from the difficulty of 
distinguishing between the effect of childhood socialization and the effect of age. When 
researchers find that cohorts differ in their attitudes, it is unclear whether this difference is a 
result of different early life experience or whether attitudes between generations differ because 
individuals’ attitudes change as people go through the life cycle. This difficulty in identifying 
the true source of between-generational variation is caused by the so-called APC problem 
(Yang and Land, 2013). The APC problem arises due to the fact that individuals who are in the 
same cohort are also of similar age. There is thus a perfect linear relationship between age, 
period, and cohort (where period is the time at which the measurement of attitudes is taken). If 
a researcher takes a measurement of attitudes at a certain point in time (period) and finds 
differences in attitudes between generations, it is difficult to know whether to attribute these 
differences to the effect of aging or to the between-generational differences in early life 
experience. 
Existing studies of the relationship between early life socialization and diffuse support 
in later life use two common methods of dealing with the APC problem. The first method 
breaks up the linearity between age, period, and cohort by measuring one of these quantities in 
a different time unit. For example, cohort and period are measured in years while age is defined 
in five-year blocs (Lutz et al., 2006). When individuals from multiple birth years make up one 
cohort, there is no longer an exact linear relationship between age, period, and cohort. The 
statistical model is then able to distinguish the effects of all three variables. The second method 
uses a hierarchical setting to break up the APC linearity (Down and Wilson, 2013; Down and 
Wilson, 2017; Yang and Land, 2013). The hierarchical (multilevel) approach to APC (HAPC) 
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is used for repeated individual-level cross-sectional data. Like in the first approach, either age 
or cohort is defined in multi-year blocs. The HAPC model then views individual respondents 
as clustered both in period and in cohort. The hierarchical model does a better job accounting 
for the period and cohort clustering than the first type of approach. The HAPC model is, 
therefore, a superior solution to the APC problem.  
Although the above-mentioned approaches to APC are helpful, they both share one 
serious shortcoming. This shortcoming stems from the inherent limitations of the data. Even 
these advanced methods cannot fully overcome the fact that the measurements of age and 
cohort in the data coincide. In other words, the fundamental problem here is a measurement 
problem: Although we are interested in the effect of socialization experience, we are using age 
to measure socialization experience. In contrast, this article does not measure early life 
socialization by focusing on individuals' birth year. Instead, it measures the level of early life 
socialization by focusing on early life socialization experience. In the case of EU citizens, the 
level of early life political socialization into the European political system does not fully 
overlap with age. Therefore, in contrast to the traditional approaches to APC, this study is able 
to parse out the effect of age from the effect of early life socialization into the European 
political system.  
As recommended by Dinas and Stoker (2014), focusing on the socializing influence 
itself, rather than on the concept of a cohort, is a better way of overcoming the APC problem. 
In conventional APC studies, the variable cohort is only a proxy variable for the actual cause - 
the early life socialization experience. In contrast, in the approach recommended by Dinas and 
Stoker (2014), researchers do not use this proxy variable. They work directly with the concept 
of early life experience. This approach overcomes the APC problem by finding - within the 
same age group - individuals with different levels of exposure to the socializing influence. This 
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allows the analysis to effectively distinguish between the effect of early life socializing 
experience and the effect of age.  
The EU provides a suitable case for employing this approach to APC analysis. The EU 
is appropriate because of its gradual geographical expansion. While in the early years of the 
integration process, only six countries participated in European integration, by 2013, there were 
28 member states. As a result of this gradual stretching of the EU’s borders, European citizens 
have diverse early life experiences with the EU. Some citizens have lived their entire lives 
within the European supranational political system; others became part of this political system 
as adults. Thanks to this diversity, the European citizenry encompasses individuals who are the 
same age but who have widely different early life experiences with the European supranational 
political system. Taking this approach to APC analysis allows me to study the relationship 
between early life socialization into the political system on the one hand, and diffuse support 
in later life on the other, while effectively distinguishing between the effect of childhood 
experience and the effect of age. 
I apply this approach to data from 25 EU member states.i The analysis uses data from 
the 2010-14 Eurobarometer surveysii and examines to what extent different levels of early life 
socialization into the political system of the EU are related to diffuse support for the EU in 
adulthood. The time period following the Great Recession of 2008 is especially suitable for an 
analysis of diffuse support. As the theoretical section above explains, any empirical 
measurement of political support is a mix of two types of support: specific and diffuse. Even 
measurements that are commonly viewed as measurements of diffuse support may contain a 
performance-dependent (specific) component. In a time of economic downturn, however, when 
citizens’ opinions of the political regime’s performance are down, specific support decreases, 
while diffuse support remains stable. As a result, empirical measurements of diffuse support 
are less ‘contaminated’ by specific support than in times when specific support is likely to be 
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high owing to the favourable economic situation. Studying diffuse support during a time of 
economic crisis, therefore, allows us to obtain more precise measurements of diffuse support.  
Diffuse support for the EU (the dependent variable) is defined as an affective 
attachment to the political system. The variable is measured in two ways in order to achieve 
greater robustness of the results. First, I use a binary variable indicating whether or not 
individuals have a European identity.iii Second, I use a binary variable indicating whether 
respondents do or do not see themselves as European citizens.  
Each of the two measurements of diffuse support for the EU captures the concept from 
a slightly different angle. European identity clearly expresses the concept of diffuse support as 
an affective attachment. However, it is possible that some respondents understand this question 
as being about an attachment to Europe, not to the EU. If many respondents understand this 
survey question as being about Europe rather than about the EU, this measurement of diffuse 
support will have weak validity. In order to make the results of the study more robust, I employ 
the second measurement of the dependent variable: the measure of European citizenship. The 
measure of European citizenship captures a different, more civic, type of attachment to the EU 
than the measure of European identity. Unlike European identity, however, it is clearly tied to 
the EU. Both measures thus provide valid measurements of diffuse support for the EU.  
The level of socializing influence of the European political system is the key 
explanatory concept. It is defined as the number of years of a respondent’s childhood during 
which the respondent’s country participated in European integration. European integration has 
been strengthening over time, though. The Maastricht Treaty responsible for the creation of the 
EU (in 1992) was a major step in the strengthening of European integration. I, therefore, 
distinguish between early life political socialization that took place before the EU was 
established and early life political socialization that took place after the EU was established. 
There are thus two key independent variables: (a) early life socialization in a weakly integrated 
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Europe (Socialization (weak)); and (b) early life socialization in a strongly integrated Europe 
(Socialization (strong)). Early life socialization in a weakly integrated Europe is defined as the 
number of years lived between the ages of five and 15 during which the respondent’s country 
participated in European integration up until 1993. Early life socialization in a strongly 
integrated Europe is defined as the number of years lived between the ages of five and 15 
during which the respondent’s country was a member of the EU. Both variables range from 
zero to 10. 
In addition to the main independent variables, the analysis controls for a number of 
control variables that, according to the existing literature, are related to support for the EU 
(Clark and Hellwig, 2012; Gabel, 1998; Harteveld et al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2006; Nelsen and 
Guth, 2000). These include education, egocentric and sociotropic evaluations of the national 
economy, confidence in national political institutions, occupation, age, and gender. iv  In 
addition, I include a control variable for post-communist countries in order to control for 
another major country-level early life socialization influence that is not related to European 
integration. Religious denomination has also been identified in the existing literature as a 
source of diffuse support for the EU (Nelsen et al., 2001; Nelsen et al., 2011). Due to data 
limitations, however, a control variable for religious denomination cannot be included. 
Nevertheless, control variables that are included account for major sources of diffuse support 
and omitting religion from the analysis is not expected to seriously bias the results. More details 
on how the control variables are defined are provided in the Online appendix. 
 
Analysis and results 
Both dependent variables in this analysis are binary. I, therefore, rely on logistic 
regressions. The nature of the data poses a methodological challenge, however. The data are 
cross-sectional, and they are clustered in countries and in years of data collection.v  It is 
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important to account for both types of clustering or the results of the statistical analysis would 
be biased (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). I account for the country-level clustering by 
estimating two-level random intercept models. Country is the clustering variable in these 
models. In order to deal with the clustering in years of data collection, I run the model 
separately for each year. When considering the method of analysis, it is important to note that 
there is a disagreement among scholars as to whether logit models are the best tool in these 
cases or whether linear probability models are better. Although I believe that the random effects 
logit is the most appropriate tool for the present case, I address the methodological concerns 
raised in this debate by estimating a linear probability model as well. The alternative analysis 
is presented in the Online appendix. Using the alternative method of analysis does not change 
the substantive conclusions.  
I model diffuse support for the EU as a function of early life socialization into the 
European political system and a number of control variables. First, the analysis focuses on the 
measure of diffuse support that captures individuals’ feelings of European citizenship. Key 
results of this multilevel logistic regression are reported in the upper half of Table 1 (full results 
can be found in the Online appendix). Figures 1 and 2 interpret the results of the model, 
highlighting aspects relevant to the evaluation of the hypothesis. Figure 1 shows the predicted 
probability of sharing a sense of European citizenship by the level of early life socialization in 
a weakly integrated Europe. If the hypothesis were supported by the data, the probability would 
increase with the number of years of socialization in the European political system. This is not 
the case, however. The probability of feeling oneself a citizen of the EU slowly decreases as 
the number of years spent in childhood in a weakly integrated Europe increases. The decrease, 
however, is not statistically significant. The confidence intervals overlap to a large extent. 
Therefore, growing up in a weakly integrated Europe does not seem to affect diffuse support 
in later life. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
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[Table 1 about here] 
  
Figure 2 shows the probability of feeling oneself a citizen of the EU, depending on the 
amount of early life socialization in a strongly integrated EU. In contrast to the expectations of 
the hypothesis, the probability of sharing a sense of EU citizenship decreases slightly as the 
amount of early life socialization in the EU increases. vi  Nevertheless, the differences in 
predicted probabilities are not large enough to be statistically significant. Early life 
socialization in a strongly integrated EU does not influence the level of diffuse support for the 
EU in later life. 
If we measure diffuse support for the EU as European identity, the results are very 
similar. As in the case of European citizenship, I estimated a series of multilevel logistic 
regressions. Key results are in the bottom half of Table 1, full results are in the Online appendix. 
I interpret the model by calculating predicted probabilities of having a European identity, 
depending on the amount of time of early life socialization spent in a weakly or strongly 
integrated Europe. As in the case of European citizenship, the results show a negative 
relationship between early life socialization in a weakly integrated Europe on the one hand, 
and diffuse support for the EU on the other. This relationship, however, is not statistically 
significant within the range of values of the independent variable. These results are similar for 
the variable measuring early life socialization in the strongly integrated EU. Although the 
negative relationship between socialization and diffuse support seems slightly stronger, it is, 
again, not statistically significant.  
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In sum, no matter how diffuse support is measured, there is not a systematic relationship 
between early life socialization in the European political system and diffuse support for the EU 
in adulthood. Although the relationship between childhood socialization and diffuse support is 
not statistically significant, it is puzzling that the relationship is negative. It may be the case 
that individuals who experienced more socialization have higher, even unrealistic, expectations 
about the EU, and as these expectations are confronted by the reality of the EU’s functioning, 
the resulting disappointment decreases diffuse support for the EU. The following section 
checks the robustness of these findings by examining the hypothesis from a different angle.  
 
Robustness checks 
The previous section concluded that there is no systematic relationship between early 
life socialization in the European political system and diffuse support for the EU in later life. 
This finding is based on an analysis of a broad set of 25 EU member states. Although the 
breadth of the sample is an advantage, there are potential drawbacks as well. A cohort analysis 
of a broad set of countries may raise objections to the strength of the causal inference resulting 
from such analysis. It may be argued that individuals who grew up in the EU and individuals 
who grew up outside the EU differ in other socialization experiences, not just in their early life 
experience with the European political system.  
In order to address this weakness, I narrow the analysis down to two EU member states. 
This allows me to apply the design-based approach to APC analysis (Dinas and Stoker, 2014). 
The approach requires the researcher to find two groups of individuals. The groups should be 
as similar as possible, but they should differ on the value of the key independent variable. 
Denmark and Sweden, the two countries selected for this analysis, fit these requirements well. 
The two countries differ in their EU-accession dates. While Denmark joined the EU in 1973, 
Sweden joined in 1995. There is thus a fairly large group of Danish and Swedish citizens who 
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are of the same generation but who differ in their early life experience with the European 
political system. 
Importantly for the logic of the design-based approach, Denmark and Sweden are very 
similar on a number of characteristics that may potentially influence the development of diffuse 
political support (such as the economic situation in the 1973-95 time period, the type of welfare 
state, the party system, and the tradition of strong social democratic parties). Therefore, if the 
analysis finds that Danish citizens who grew up between 1973-95 have more diffuse support 
for the EU than Swedish citizens of the same age, I will be able to conclude with greater 
confidence that this difference in the level of diffuse support originates in their early life 
experience with the European political system. If, on the other hand, I find that the generations 
of Danish and Swedish citizens who grew up between 1973 and 1995 have a comparable level 
of diffuse support for the EU, I will be more confident in concluding that early life political 
socialization in the political system is not important for diffuse support in later life. 
In this analysis, I use the same Eurobarometer data as in the previous section, but I only 
include Denmark and Sweden in the analysis. Both dependent variables and all control 
variablesvii are the same as in the preceding analysis. The cohort variable in this analysis, 
however, is defined differently. In accordance with the logic of the design-based approach to 
APC analysis, I divide the sample into twelve cohorts. These cohorts are defined by 
respondents’ ages. The first cohort includes individuals who were 16 years or older when 
European integration started (individuals born in 1939 or earlier). The second-oldest generation 
and most of the following generations are defined in five-year blocs (born in 1940-1944, 1945-
1949, etc.). Only the youngest generation comprises all individuals born in 1990 or later. 
The goal of the analysis is to determine whether being subjected to the socializing 
influence of European integration in early life results in a higher level of diffuse support in 
later life. The different EU-accession dates of Denmark and Sweden will provide leverage in 
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finding the answer to this puzzle. Using the language of the design-based approach, Danish 
citizens who grew up between 1973 and 1995 are the ‘treated’ group because they were 
subjected to the socializing influence of European integration. Swedish citizens who 
experienced their childhood in the same time period are the control group. These Swedish 
citizens are of the same generation as their Danish counterparts, but they did not live within 
integrating Europe when they were growing up. If the main hypothesis is supported, we will 
expect that Danish citizens who experienced their childhood between 1973 and 1995 will have 
higher diffuse support for the EU than Swedish citizens who grew up during the same time 
period. 
In order to establish whether the ‘treated’ group differs from the control group, 
I estimate a logistic regression. Diffuse support for the EU (measured as EU citizenship and 
European identity) is the dependent variable. Cohort is the key independent variable. The 
model further includes a dummy variable distinguishing Denmark from Sweden (country) and 
a set of control variables. In order to observe whether the effect of cohort differs between 
Denmark and Sweden, I include an interaction term interacting cohort and country. In order to 
account for clustering in years of data collection, I run a separate model for each year. 
First, I will present the results of the logistic regression modelling European citizenship, 
then results from a logistic regression modelling European identity. Full results of the model 
are available in the Online appendix. Figures 3 and 4 interpret the results of these estimations. 
The figures show the differences in the predicted probability of diffuse support for the EU 
between the treated group and the control group for each of the twelve cohorts. If the hypothesis 
were supported, we would expect the difference to be significantly larger for the cohorts born 
approximately between 1965 and 1989 than for the other cohorts. This expectation, however, 
is largely not supported by the data. With the exception of the cohort born between 1985 and 
1989, no cohorts display a significant difference between the ‘treated’ group and the control 
 20 
group. Even the 1985-1989 cohort displays a significant difference in only the data for 2012 
(European citizenship) and 2013 (European identity). This suggests that having grown up 
within integrating Europe does not lead to more diffuse support for the EU in adulthood. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here]  
 
Overall, this analysis focused on Sweden and Denmark does not support the main 
hypothesis.viii It thus provides additional evidence in favour of the conclusion drawn in the 
previous section: early life political socialization in the political system is not essential for 




Early life political socialization into the political system is often considered important 
for the development of an individual’s lasting affective attachment to a political system. Both 
in the general comparative literature and literature focused on the EU, early life political 
socialization is highlighted as an important influence on diffuse support for the political system. 
In contrast to this literature, the present analysis shows that the level of childhood socialization 
into the European political system makes no noticeable difference for the level of diffuse 
support for the EU in later life.  
This conclusion is based on a series of empirical analyses of data from the 2010-2014 
Eurobarometer surveys. In contrast to previous empirical work on the relationship between 
early life political socialization and diffuse support, this study is able to effectively distinguish 
the effect of early life political socialization from the effect of age. The analysis presented here 
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thus allows for a much clearer picture of the degree to which early life political socialization 
affects diffuse support in later life than previous studies have been able to provide. 
Despite the innovative nature of the research presented in this study, the conclusions 
require a caveat. It may be argued that the measure of early life socialization into the political 
system of the EU is too crude and that there are great within-country differences in the extent 
to which individuals are socialized into the political system of the EU. For example, schools 
may differ in how much European integration is covered in their curriculum. Therefore, the 
conclusions of this study would have been stronger if a more precise measurement of early life 
political socialization into the EU were available. Unfortunately, this is not the case and the 
measurement used in this study constitutes the best one available. Nevertheless, even though 
the measurement of early life socializing influence of European integration is not completely 
perfect, it is a valid measurement that gauges the level of exposure to the socializing influence 
of European integration.    
The findings presented in this manuscript have implications for the EU’s strategies for 
its relationship with its citizenry. This article shows that those who grew up within integrating 
Europe do not have more diffuse support for the EU than those who grew up outside the EU. 
This implies that diffuse support for the political system of the EU develops as a result of 
experience that individuals gain in adulthood. Political socialization in early life is thus not 
enough to provide the political system of the EU with a lasting affective attachment of its 
citizens. The political system needs to provide positive experiences in order to maintain and 
reinforce this affective attachment throughout the individuals’ lives. These results have 
practical implications for the EU as a political system. Diffuse support among the EU’s citizens 
is one of the essential ingredients that keep the political system of the EU alive. If the EU 
wishes to maintain this source of stability, it is not enough to rely on early life political 
socialization. Generating positive experiences for adult citizens and taking active measures to 
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reinforce the affective attachment of European citizens to the EU is essential for maintaining 
citizens’ diffuse support. 
In addition, the findings of this study have implications for the way the integration of 
citizens in new EU member countries or the integration of migrants from outside the EU can 
affect public support for the EU. The results of this study suggest that the newness of EU 
citizens or residents does not necessarily constitute a weak spot in terms of public support for 
the political system of the EU. Given that early life political socialization is not essential for 
the development of an affective attachment to the EU, the new members of the population can 
learn to support their new political system as effectively as if they had grown up in it. 
These findings suggest new pathways for future research. First, while the conclusions 
of this examination hold for the EU, without further research, it is unclear to what extent these 
conclusions apply to nation states. It is possible that, in contrast to nation states, the EU is not 
an important enough political object to imprint on children a lasting affective attachment. 
Future research may, therefore, explore opportunities for employing the design-based approach 
in the study of this question in the context of nation states. Second, there are still open questions 
about how exactly diffuse support develops as a result of later life socialization. What types of 
experience promote the development of this affective attachment to the political system? How 
does early life socialization interact with later-life learning? In addition, exploring whether 
there are heterogeneous effects of socialization across socio-economic groups and across 
countries is another question worth examining. Existing cross-sectional survey datasets, as well 
as some panel data or customized survey data collected in European countries, may provide 
fruitful ground for exploring these research questions. In a time of rising Euroscepticism as 
well as rising disenchantment with national governmental institutions across EU member 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of feeling oneself to be an EU citizen (by childhood 
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of feeling oneself to be an EU citizen (by childhood 
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Figure 4. Differences in predicted probability of having a European identity. 
 
 
i Bulgaria and Romania are excluded from the analysis because they entered the EU only two years 
before the time period under examination. Croatia is excluded because it entered the EU during the 
time period examined here. 
ii Standard Eurobarometer surveys of the following numbers have been used: Eurobarometer 73.4, 
Eurobarometer 75.3, Eurobarometer 77.3, Eurobarometer 79.3, and Eurobarometer 81.2.  
iii The question wording for the first measurement is as follows: ‘For each of the following statements, 
please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. ... You feel you are a citizen of 
the EU. Yes, definitely/ Yes, to some extent/ No, not really/ No, definitely not/ DK.’ The original four-
category ordinal variable was recoded into a binary variable in order to make interpretation more 
straightforward. ‘Yes, definitely’ and ‘Yes, to some extent’ were coded as 1, the rest as 0. The wording 
of the second measurement of the dependent variable is: ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as...? 
(NATIONALITY) only/ (NATIONALITY) and European/ European and (NATIONALITY)/European 
only/ DK.’ This variable was recoded such that the ‘nationality only’ category is coded 0, the rest is 
coded 1. In all variables the ‘don’t know’ answers were coded as missing data.  
iv Further information about the expectations for each of these control variables is available in the 
Online appendix. 
v The feeling of citizenship variable is present in five Eurobarometer surveys from 2010 to 2014. Data 
from these five surveys are thus used for the analysis modelling the citizenship variable. The identity 
variable is present only in Eurobarometer surveys from the following years: 2010, 2013, and 2014. 
vi Predicted probabilities for all multilevel models were calculated by using the margins command in 
Stata 14 with the pu0 option. This option assumes that the random intercept equals zero. The resulting 
predicted probability is the population median probability (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). 
vii Only the control variable marking post-communist countries is not included because it is not 
relevant to the comparison of Denmark and Sweden.  
viii In addition to this robustness check, further robustness checks have been performed. These 
included: relaxing the parallel period and age effects assumption in the model restricted to Sweden and 
Denmark, alternative specifications of the age interval that defines early life political socialization in 
the main model, using a logarithmized version of the key independent variable in the main model, 
using a linear probability model (instead of the random effects logit model), accounting for the 
possibility that socialization into the EU takes place up to three years prior the actual EU accession, as 
well as running the main model on Western European countries only. Overall, neither of these 
robustness analyses supports the hypothesis. Results of these robustness checks are available in the 
Online appendix. 
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